With
\nnew state of the art sporting arenas costing anywhere between
\n$30 million to $300 million to build, huge financial investments
\nmust be made. There are many options in financing sport and
\nrecreation facilities than involve both public and private
\narrangements and investments. This paper will address various
\nfinancial ventures and the benefits and pitfalls of those
\noptions.<\/p>\n
Funding
\nmay be separated into two distinct groups public funding and
\nprivate funding. Public funding may included but may not be
\nlimited to taxes, municipal bonds, certificates of participation
\nand special authority bonds. Public funding may include but
\nmay not be limited to, cash donations, contributions, naming
\nrights, concessionaire and or restaurant rights, sponsorships,
\nlease agreements, luxury and preferred seating, parking fees,
\nadvertising, and gifts shops revenues. Other ways of financing
\nin order to spread the enormous costs of building a state
\nof the art sporting facility is that projects have been partnered
\nin joint public and private funding. Often, the public funding
\nis in the form of land contributions or luxury taxes and the
\nprivate contributions are reflected within the facility itself.<\/p>\n
Cities,
\ncounties and states such as Tampa and Miami Florida, Nashville
\nTN. and Irving TX. have picked up the entire cost for new
\narenas through public funding. More than half of the construction
\ncosts for other facilities in Dallas, Seattle, Atlanta, Raleigh,
\nN.C. and St. Paul, MN. are financed by their local governments.<\/p>\n
Public In Often At Bonds Some One In Non One The Revenue Because Municipal Investment High AAA: AA: Medium A: Baa: Ba: B: Caa: C: General Other Certificates Residents Private The In Denver a state of the art facility, the Pepsi Center, was Not Naming A Asset Securities Extra Opinion<\/strong><\/p>\n It Chart Legend Miami, Nashville, Tampa, Seattle, Raleigh, Atlanta, St. Dallas, Buffalo, Columbus, Portland, Philadelphia, Denver, Montreal Washington Vancouver, Canada Boston, Ottawa, Arlington, Irving, Fort Grand East Scottsdale Foxboro, MA. Phoenix San Sources REFERENCES<\/strong><\/p>\n Arnott, Barker, R. (11\/6\/2000). Buying munis, not heartbreak. Business Bernstein, A. (8\/23\/99). Arena name dispute influences future Bonded indebtedness in county up 12 percent from fy99-00. Boston mayor leans toward financing plan for proposed new Crawford, D. (11\/27\/95). Sports marketers debate impact of Crawford, D. (8\/11\/2000). Calif. model: Low risk funding of Dwyer III, J. (7\/10\/2000). The cost of not building a stadium. Hovey, J. (July, 1998). Cheap funding through bonds. Nation’s Kamerick, M. (3\/20\/98). Senator floats plan to fund AG campus Kaplan, D. (5\/8\/98). Insurers ok private bonds for funding Mitchell, E. (9\/3\/99). How arena became a reality. Denver Muret, D. (11\/15\/99). Two pass, two fail in new venue referendums. Prior, C. (May\/Jun 99). Asset backed arenas. Treasury & Renberg, W. (1995). All about bond funds. John Wiley & Sawyer, T., Goldfine, B., Hypes, M., LaRue, R., Seidler, T. Stile C. (8\/23\/00). New Jersey governor approves funding for Suggs, W. (10\/17\/97). Dallas arena deal takes middle road Tankerson, R. ( 6\/20\/97). Don’t compromise public transit Weiss, S. (2\/19\/99). City staff will draft funding plan for Zoltak, J. (3\/3\/97). NFL economics separate haves and have Web sites:<\/strong> www.epinion.com.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\n With
\nfunding in the form of taxes<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nthe state of Texas, there was a controversy around the arena
\nfunding bill called House Bill 92. Passed in 1997, House Bill
\n92 is a tool that communities can use as possible funding
\noptions for the development of new sport facilities by levying
\ntaxes and tapping sales tax funds. The bill authorizes cities
\nto tap the sales tax to fund other economic development projects
\nas well (San Antonio Business Journal, 1998). Many have their
\neyes on the funding source. One of those interested was State
\nSenator Frank Madla, who had a proposal using the House Bill
\n92 to couple the funding of a new arena, community projects
\nand a campus expansion at the University of Texas, San Antonio.
\nConsidering the little support that voters had toward approving
\na sales tax to fund a new sports arena, a referendum involving
\na combination of many different projects, might have had more
\nof an appeal. Community leaders reacted to the idea of a bundled
\nproject referendum with apprehension. Although, it may have
\nmore of a voter support, the plan will limit the amount of
\nmoney that could be raised for any one project. A half cent
\nsales tax would bring in about $50 million a year and spread
\nout over several projects, it is not a lot of funding. A \u00bd
\ncent sales tax was also desired solely for the building of
\na new arena for the San Antonio Spurs, the Livestock Show
\n& Rodeo and ice hockey. Arguments opposed to the use of
\nthe \u00bd cent sales tax came from the Metropolitan Transit
\nin San Antonio. The sales tax that the House Bill 92 refers
\nto is what Texas voters had previously designated as the Mass
\nTransit Authority (MTA) sales tax. The state legislation allowed
\nfor the MTA to receive a full cent for operating a public
\ntransit system. The Metropolitan Transit decided to collect
\nonly a \u00bd cent with the expectation that the additional
\n\u00bd cent would be available for future needs. It is that
\nextra \u00bd cent that was wanted for the development of
\nprojects. The MTA claims not only address the transportation
\nneeds of the community, it also maintains 550 full time jobs,
\nand provides returns three times its cost in business revenue
\nto the communities it serves. Its argument is that the building
\nof a sports arena only satisfies the private interests of
\na few people and its supporters (San Antonio Business Journal,
\n1997). A similar argument echoed in Dallas, where citizens
\nquestioned by they should pay higher taxes to benefit the
\nteam owners who are two of the wealthiest citizens in Dallas.
\nEven though the teams were contributing $105 million to build
\nthe arena, the city was getting no revenue directly from the
\nfacility (Dallas Business Journal, 1997). These arguments
\nhave lasted for several years and in 1999, the city of San
\nAntonio was exploring other funding options for the new arena.
\nNot only would voters be asked to back 1\/8 of a cent a tax
\nrevenue, but the San Antonio Spurs and other private donors
\nwould be expected to contribute funds. Besides the use of
\nsales taxes, House Bill 92 authorizes the levying of other
\npublic taxes such as motor vehicle rental tax, event parking
\ntax, hotel occupancy tax and facility use tax, which allows
\nvisiting teams to be charged up to $5,000 per game for the
\nuse of the facility. The burden of the taxes levied fall on
\nthe visitors rather than the general public. This attracted
\nopposition from trade groups, and convention groups whose
\nmembers depends on tourism. The thought is that when hotel
\nand car rental taxes are increased, fewer people will consume
\nthose services. Those opposed to the idea feel that the city
\nvisitors gets poorer by paying for something he or she may
\nnot use, a new arena, but the owners and players get richer.
\nThe cities of Dallas and Houston have taken advantage of the
\nhotel and car rental taxes. Dallas has a $230 million downtown
\narena project that is publically and privately financed. The
\nDallas plan as approved by the City Council ended up as roughly
\na 50\/50 deal between the city and the two teams to use the
\nfacility. The city contributed a total of $110 million for
\nthe construction of the arena and an additional $15 million
\nin infrastructure improvements and the teams kicked in $105
\nmillion for construction costs. In San Antonio, voters did
\napprove $110-147 million to be raised through hotel and car
\ntaxes only by slim margins. Of the 125,000 votes casts, the
\narena referendum passed by just 1,642 votes. (San Antonio
\nBusiness Journal, 1999).<\/p>\n
\nresidents are concerned with how much a new arena would cost
\nthem. One question also to be considered is how much would
\nit cost not to build at all. In a recent study done by the
\nSt. Louis Cardinals, a new stadium would bring a tax revenue
\nto both St. Louis and Missouri, from $14.5 million last year
\nto $23.2 million by 2005. By 2035 the projected revenue is
\nestimated at $77 million (St. Louis Business Journal, 2000).
\nWithout a new stadium, the city stands to loose that much.
\nOver the years, the Cardinals by investing millions in stadium
\nupgrades, has already increased tax revenues from$6.3 million
\nin 1995 to $16.4 million in 2000. The proposed ball park,
\nwould cost approximately $370 million to build and the city
\nand state would allocate a portion of taxes to fund the costs.
\nWithout a new stadium, the team president fears they will
\nnot be able to compete with division rivals and fund a higher
\npayroll. The same fate happened to the Minnesota Twins and
\nthe city of Minneapolis in 1992. After winning the 1991 World
\nSeries, the Twins asked for a new stadium to compete with
\nthe Metrodome. They were turned down, the payroll was cut
\nand attendance fell. As a result, the $3.2 million generated
\nin taxes from ticket sales, fell to $500,000 as of last year.
\nThe city of St. Louis may face the same situation and needs
\nto weigh their economic opportunities for their city.<\/p>\n
\nthe national Council For Urban Economic Development conference,
\nRick Horrow, President of Horrow Sports Adventures spoke of
\nthe revenues lost by not building needed facilities. He reported,
\n“80%-85% of team revenue that is shared comes mostly
\nfrom ticket sales and television contracts. The 15%-20% balance
\ncomes from skyboxes, parking concessions and club seats..”
\n(Amusement Business, 1997). It is this 15%-20% that is fueling
\nnew sports facility development. The average annual revenue
\nincome of the NFL is $71 million, and the top five teams average
\n$86 million. Horrow also said, the building of new NFL facilities
\ngenerally requires cooperation between cities, counties, and
\nstates, and that the financial risks and burdens borne by
\nthe public sector have been increasingly shifted onto tourists,
\nwho pay through hotel and car rental taxes and other mechanisms
\nthat minimize the cost to local taxpayers. The latest trend
\nis to package other community needs with facility funding.
\nMany of the new facilities are multipurpose facilities which
\ncan offer concerts and other events.
\nPublic funding in the form of bonds.<\/p>\n
\nare a way for a city government to generate money needed for
\nthe construction of a new or the renovation of a sports facility
\nor arena. A bond is defined as ” an interest bearing
\ncertificate issued by a government or corporation promising
\nto pay interest and to repay a sum of money (the principal)
\nat a specified date in the future”(Samuelson and Nordhaus,
\n1985, Sawyer, 1999). Bonds sold by a government are referred
\nto as municipal bonds. The two most common type of municipal
\nbonds are general obligation bonds and non guaranteed bonds.<\/p>\n
\nstate governments permit the state to fund construction and
\nother capital expenses by selling general obligation bonds
\n(GO) that are backed by their tax bases. They are considered
\nto be full faith and credit obligation bonds . Both state
\nand local governments usually ask voters to approve proposed
\nGO bond issues, an opportunity not available to voters by
\nfederal governments. Most of the time voters approve the issues
\neven though it may increase local debt and taxes. Since 1993,
\na majority of public referenda (23 of 41 ) have been approved
\ntotaling $4.4 billion in public funding. (Amusement Business,
\n1999). The funding for development may be desirable if the
\ndevelopment spurs economic growth.<\/p>\n
\nexample is that of Scottsdale in Arizona who is pursuing to
\nredevelop an old neighborhood. The redevelopment plan called
\n“Los Arcos Redevelopment Project” is being funded
\nwith private and public funds. This hefty redevelopment plan
\ncan be seen on the Internet page www.newlosarcos.com. The
\nproject costs are as follows: arena costs- $175-183 million,
\nland acquisition\/parking- $172-182 million, retail development-
\n$90-98 million, construction- $63-72 million, subtotal: $500-590
\nmillion, the over 30 year total: $1066-1125 million. The public
\nwill pay for a portion in taxes as follows: land acquisition-
\n$120-135 million, public infrastructure (streets, sewer, plazas)-
\n$30-50 million, sub total: $150-185 million, over 30 years-
\n$340-390 million, the total public participation is 30-35%
\nof the total redevelopment plan. The arena itself will be
\nfunded by the developer and the Coyotes. The plan is designed
\nto satisfy the redevelopment of the neighborhood by joining
\nthe arena with a mall, restaurants, supermarket, retailers,
\nand a movie complex. (Amusement Business, 1999).<\/p>\n
\nNew Jersey, the Governor offered this year the sum of $75
\nmillion toward the $325 million needed for the development
\nof a new arena. The arena in Newark is apart of a plan to
\nbring new retail growth to a suffering city. The state plan
\nhas two options: stay in East Rutherford and build a new arena
\nat the Meadowlands Sports Complex for $250 million or move
\nthe New Jersey Devils and Nets to downtown Newark. Both projects
\nneed voter approval. Those who want the arena built in downtown
\nNewark claim that the funds not only build an arena but rebuild
\na city. The funds will go to improving access arteries, highways,
\nexit ramps and a new parking garage. But the minimal state
\ninvestment may keep the teams in the Meadowlands since the
\nGovernor is not convinced that new downtown sports arenas
\ncan spur economic revitalization in the cities. One assemblyman
\ndisagrees, Wilfredo Caraballo, D-Essex said that the lawmakers
\nneed to seek more state funds for the Newark project, “In
\nthe Meadowlands, the land is already publicly owned. In Newark,
\nthe land still needs to be purchased. Moreover, the Meadowlands
\nproperty might be used for more lucrative ventures for the
\nresidents of this state. In Newark, the arena investment would
\nbe part of an overall, long term strategy to revitalize the
\nstate’s largest urban center.” (The Record, 2000).<\/p>\n
\nguaranteed bonds such as special authority bonds, revenue
\nbonds and certificates of participation are other sources
\nof finance that can be used to build, own and operate utilities,
\nairports, transportation systems and public purpose facilities,
\nsuch as arenas, and have no power to tax. They derive their
\nrevenues from user fees and other sources and must finance
\ngeneral and capital expenditures out of these receipts and
\nwhatever they are permitted to borrow. When issuers undertake
\ncapital projects, they sell long term bonds. One type of bond,
\ncalled an industrial development bond, can raise up to $10
\nmillion. This type of bond known as an industrial revenue
\nbond offer low interest rates and in order to be eligible
\nfor the issuance of these bonds, the borrower must show to
\nthe government that the deal will create jobs. Generally,
\nfor each $50,000 in capital raised by industrial development
\nbonds, there should be one new job. This will qualify the
\ninterest income as tax exempt to the buyers of the bonds.
\nThe city council must approve all projects using these bonds.
\n(Nation’s Business, 1998).
\nSince their securities cannot be backed by expected tax collection,
\noften the issuers pledge the revenues from their operations,
\ngiving the name revenue bonds. These are considered a greater
\nrisk for the investors than full faith bonds and credit bonds
\nand therefore likely to pay a higher interest. Instead of
\nGO bonds, which are backed by the city’s tax receipts, revenue
\nbonds would be sold and backed by specific revenues generated
\nby the new sports facilities. Such revenues may be concessions,
\nticket sales, and advertising rights. By using revenue bonds
\nrather than GO bonds the city may avoid criticism that may
\nensue from using funds needed to improve the schools, create
\naffordable housing or other city priorities.<\/p>\n
\nexample of creative financing to lower taxpayer risks is the
\ncity of West Sacramento who teamed with two other governments,
\nthe county of Yolo and neighboring Sacramento County to sell
\nbonds to build the new baseball stadium, Raley field. The
\nbonds are to be repaid entirely from team and stadium proceeds
\nover the next 30 years, where by then the River Cats will
\nown the stadium outright. The deal is structured so the team
\ncould pay off the bonds with an average game attendance of
\njust 3,500, the lowest of any AAA team. At the present time
\nthe River Cats are averaging more than 12,000 fans a game.
\nAn innovated part of their plan is to have daily deposits
\nput into a lock box account to assure that the bonds are repaid
\nto a Joint Powers Agency. Joint Powers Agencies are common
\nfor government entities to band together to pay for law enforcement,
\nfire protection, and insurance but are not common to finance
\nsports facilities (Business First, 2000). If other governments
\ncould get together, it is a promising financial package that
\nwill not raise taxes to back the bonds and lessen the risk
\nfor all involved.<\/p>\n
\ndown side is that revenue bonds may not be as popular with
\nthe fans since they are the ones coming up with the extra
\nfees. The city of Boston is considering imposing a surcharge
\nup to $100,000 on luxury box and club seats. They are also
\nconsidering a personal seat license for all ticket holders.
\nThe personal seat license requires season ticket holders to
\npurchase the right to buy certain seats every year.<\/p>\n
\nbonds which are sold by state and local governments account
\nfor about 2\/3rds of the $100-200 billion in new state and
\nlocal government debt. GO’s account for about 1\/3rd. In the
\nLas Vegas NV. area, Clark County’s total bonded indebtedness
\nis $2.9 billion, which is up 18% from last fiscal year. The
\nlargest fiscal year percentage increase was posted by the
\nLas Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, which had $172
\nmillion in debt last fiscal year and is $312 million this
\nyear. The 82% increase was due primarily to the issuance of
\nbonds for the current conventional hall expansion project.
\nAccording to Nevada’s Taxpayers Association President, Carole
\nVilardo, “We’re still well below our legislatively imposed
\nGO(General Obligation) limit.” (Las Vegas Business Press,
\n2000). Under state law, Clark County GO bond issuance is limited
\nto 10 % of its assessed valuation. Current assessed valuation
\nstands at $34.1 billion while the county’s GO bonded indebtedness
\nstands at $1.2 billion or 35% of its limit. Revenue bonds
\nare not considered in the debt cap. Clark County’s $1.6 billion
\nin revenue bonds account for more than 54% of all its indebtedness.
\nThe total indebtedness for the 5 area cities in the Las Vegas
\narea and special authority entities such as the water district,
\nwater authority, and international airport amount to $8.6
\nbillion for FY00-01, up 12.1% from the previous year.(Las
\nVegas Business Press, 2000).<\/p>\n
\nincome from state and local GO and revenue bonds is exempt
\nfrom federal income tax, they have a strong appeal to many
\ntaxpayers. Unlike the federal government which has maintained
\nits reputation for prompt payment of debts, state and local
\ngovernments have periodically, in recent years, defaulted
\non their bonds or have come close to doing so, making it important
\nto be mindful of the credit quality of the government securities.<\/p>\n
\nbonds whether GO or revenue, are rated by the rating agencies
\nin a manner similar to their ratings of corporate bonds rating.
\nThe most credit worthy corporations are given a AAA rating.
\nThe next three grades are AA, A, and Baa. The bottom ratings
\ngo to the most speculative or junk bonds, which would be rated
\nas, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and C (Renberg 1995). The rating can be
\nimproved as the company’s finances are monitored and upgrades
\nit if the issuer’s situation improves. It also may be downgraded
\nif the situation deteriorates. Many of the corporate bonds
\nhave maturities of 30 years, which may involve call risk,
\nwhich is similar to the prepayment risk of mortgage backed
\nsecurities. An investor should expect to be compensated for
\nthe degree of risk that they will accept. Securities with
\nthe highest rating, will offer the lowest yields and likewise,
\nthe lower ratings will be higher yields. Revenue bonds tend
\nto have lower yields due to their debt is met out of fees
\nand receipts and therefore, may be affected by recessions,
\na fall in supply and demand by falling out of favor, or being
\naffected by other services such as water, and utilities. (Renberg
\n1995).<\/p>\n
\nGrades are as follows:<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nGrade<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nBonds with this rating are judged to be the best quality.
\nThey carry the smallest degree of investment risk.<\/p>\n
\nThese are high quality by all standards. They are rated lower
\nbecause their margins of protection is not as large.<\/p>\n
\nGrade<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nThese bonds possess many favorable investment attributes.
\nEven though, factors giving security to principal and interest
\nare considerable, elements may be present that suggest a susceptibility
\nto impairment some time in the future.<\/p>\n
\nThey are neither highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest
\npayments and principal security appear adequate for the present
\nby certain elements may be lacking or may be characteristically
\nunreliable over any great length of time.
\nSpeculative (junk)<\/p>\n
\nTheir future cannot be considered well assured. Safeguards
\nand protection for security may be very moderate<\/p>\n
\nThese bonds lack characteristics of the desirable investment.
\nAssurance of interest and principal payments over any long
\nperiod of time may be small.<\/p>\n
\nThese are of poor standing. They may be in default or elements
\nof danger of the principal or interest.<\/p>\n
\nThese are the lowest rated class of bonds. They are considered
\nto have extremely poor prospects of attaining any real investment.
\n(Renberg 1995).<\/p>\n
\nobligation vs. revenue bonds. General obligation bonds are
\nserviced out of appropriations and backed by the credit and
\ntax base of the issuing unit of government. Interest and principal
\non revenue bonds are paid from the revenues of the facilities
\nthat were built with the money received from their sale. Generally
\nthe supply of revenue bonds is greater in longer maturities,
\nwhile the supply of general obligation bonds are greater in
\nintermediate maturity. GO bonds are considered a better credit
\nrisk because of the taxing authority behind them.
\nMany long term municipal bonds timely payments are insured.
\nIt is intended to protect the funds against loss in the event
\nof a state or local governments unit’s default. The literature
\nof the bond should state whether or not it is insured. Three
\ntypes of insurance are involved in tax free bond funds. First:
\nNew insurance is what state and local governments or their
\nunderwriters obtain if the issuers qualify. Higher ratings
\nsuch as AAA may result from the coverage. Second, secondary
\nmarket insurance is purchased by investors, to cover bonds
\nas long as they are outstanding. Third, portfolio insurance
\nis bought by funds to cover bonds in a portfolio (Renberg
\n1995). It is not enough that the bonds that funds buy have
\nratings that meet their standards, they must have the claims
\npaying ability of the insurance company providing the coverage.
\nMost funds make certain the insurance companies are rated
\nAAA and remain at that standard. Insurance is an extra layer
\nof protection. Bond insurance negates the need for costly
\nletters of credit and grants an instant AAA rating, and interest
\nrates paid to bond investors are lower. Therefore, refinancing
\nat a later date would not be necessary. With most sporting
\narenas now being built as revenue palaces, underwriters and
\ninvestors are more open to insuring private sports deals.<\/p>\n
\nrisks to watch for in long term municipal bonds purchase is
\nbonds being “called” prior to maturity (Barker 2000).
\nSimply, if a long term bond gets called after five years,
\nthe purchaser want to make sure that its total yield is similar
\nto that of other 5 year bonds. The longer the term the bond,
\nthe more likely it is to lose value before maturity if interest
\nrates rise. On the other hand, lower rates boost a bond’s
\nvalue. Some bond brokers advise against bonds with maturities
\npast five years or so unless they are likely to be called
\nsooner. For example, the average AAA rated five year municipal
\nbond may trade 4.64%, while a 10 year bond may yield just
\n4.93%. The interest rate risk with the 10 year bond may not
\nbe worth the risk (Barker 2000). When purchasing or trading
\nbonds, one usually goes through a bonds broker who will charge
\na commission for the transaction. An alternative would be
\nto call a firms such as Charles Schwab or Fidelity Investments
\nand they will sell from their inventory of bonds, not as brokers
\nbut as principal. They make their money on the bid spread
\nand not commissions. (Barker 2000).<\/p>\n
\nof participation are a government buying a facility or land
\nand then leasing it out to pay off the facility’s expenses.
\nAn example is that of the city of Boston. Several plans are
\nbeing considered for the new Fenway Park in which the city
\ncould invest $200 million. The city may issue revenue bonds
\nto buy a proposed site for a new ball park next to the 88
\nyear old Fenway and assist with construction costs. It has
\nnot been determined yet as to whether the city will own the
\nnew ball park and require the Boston red Sox to pay an annual
\nlease or it the new facility will be jointly owned by the
\nteam and the city (The Boston Globe, 2000).<\/p>\n
\nfrequently do not support bonds or increases in tax bases.
\nIn Columbus Ohio, financing for a new facility is needed.
\nPolled residents said that they do not support a sales tax
\nincrease to fund a stadium, the present location of their
\nstadium is fine and if the Clippers did move, they would prefer
\na new location outside of town (Business First, 2000). In
\nDallas, residents resisted the tax increase for a new arena
\nto replace the outdated Reunion Center. One resident’s opinion
\nwas that the only reason to develop a new center was to add
\nluxury suites which doesn’t add back to the community but
\npays for the escalating player salaries (Dallas Business Journal,
\n1997). Likewise, voters struck down proposed tax increases
\nto help construct a $160 million basketball arena for th4
\nNBA Rockets in Houston, and a $325 million baseball stadium
\nfor MLB’s Twins in St. Paul MN. Other sources of revenues
\nfor the building of sports facilities are available for team
\nowners to look at such as private funding.<\/p>\n
\nfunding is a way to finance a new or renovated facility without
\na tax increase and little risk to taxpayers. New arenas in
\nSan Francisco, Denver, Washington D.C., Boston, and in Vancouver,
\nMontreal, and Ottawa in Canada all have been built entirely
\nwith private funds. Minimal public funding was used for arena
\nprojects such as in Columbus, Portland and Philadelphia.
\nPrivate funding through naming rights.<\/p>\n
\nSan Francisco Giants’s privately funded ballpark opened this
\nyear. The sale of licenses and naming rights was a key source
\nof income for the ballpark. The San Antonio Spurs will sell
\nits naming rights to the Ellerbe Becket venue. Similarly,
\npossible naming rights may contribute to the new Boston stadium
\nwhich could add up to $50 million toward the financing. The
\ncity may plan to allow the Red Sox to retain revenue generated
\nfrom the sale of naming rights but still be a city owed facility.
\nBut Bostonians have an affiliation with the name Fenway Park
\nand fans may be furious with the changing of the name(The
\nBoston Globe,2000). American Airlines paid $2.1 million a
\nyear for 20 years for the naming rights of the American Airlines
\nArena in Miami FL. The Miami Heat who predominately plays
\nat the arena signed up sponsorships with CitiCorp\/Citi Group,
\nLucent Technologies, Carnival Cruises and Florida Power &
\nLight.(South Florida Business Journal, Miami-Dade Edition,
\n1998). Dallas’s Stars, of the NHL will receive revenues from
\nnaming rights , concessions, parking and other arena income
\nwhen their new arena will open. In Seattle the Seahawks will
\nsplit arena revenues with the city and the owner. Fans may
\nbe getting tired of the corporate naming of stadiums. On the
\nweb site www.epinion.com. the user can look up stadiums by
\noption of name, sport or city. A brief description and rating
\nof the stadium\/arena is available with comments from the fans.
\nOne critic wrote, “Personally, I hate corporate names
\non buildings. Candlestick Park is now 3Com Park, Joe murphy
\nStadium is called Qualcomm, and Joe Robbie is Pro Players
\nStadium. What’s next? The Preparation H Arena? Kibbles and
\nBits Stadium? Depends Fieldhouse?” (Craigmoosh, 2000).
\nThe comment rings true, but it is the corporate sponsors that
\npay for the upgrades, player salaries and other costly expenses.
\nIt is an amusing and interesting site to browse.<\/p>\n
\ndeveloped entirely by private funding. The facility which
\ncosts $170 million almost didn’t get built when one of the
\noriginal funding partners pulled out of the deal. The one
\ncompany left would had to pay $2 million a year for 25 years
\nand not even own the asset at the end of the period. The two
\nprimary teams who would play at the new center are the Nuggets
\nand the Avalanche who had a prior lease agreement with the
\ncity at the McNichols arena. In order to break the leases,
\nthe city wanted a commitment from the Nuggets and the Avalanche
\nto stay in Denver for 25 years at the new center. The teams
\nresisted. There was a stall of building for 2 years. Finally
\na deal was struck with the city. The arena would be deeded
\nto the city of Denver when it opened but leased back to the
\nteams for 25 years to ensure they did not move during the
\nspan of the city’s agreement. During the 25 years the city
\nwill take all sales tax proceeds generated by the arena as
\ncompensation for the teams breaking their prior leases. Ascent
\nEntertainment Group Inc. who owned the Colorado Avalanche,
\nagreed to pay the arena’s construction costs and an exemption
\non a 10% city\/county seat tax. At the end of the 25 years,
\nthe teams will own the arena. The city was happy that no tax
\nmoney was spent and the received additional sales taxes from
\nthe Pepsi Center. Major sponsors contributed their funds in
\nexchange for naming rights, such as Pepsi, who contributed
\nmillions. The amphitheater is called Coors Meadow, which provides
\na direct path to the Coors Tap Room bar inside the arena.
\nPrivate concession stands who pay leases offer items from
\nall over Colorado’s eateries. Other sponsorships include the
\nDenver Post to got the Fanway and upscale restaurant on the
\nclub level. The business center is named for US west Inc.
\nwho offers the business community benefits from the new Pepsi
\ncenter because it offers state of the art conference rooms
\nfor rent. Another major sponsor Conoco, has a service stations
\nand mini marts next to the arena, and is one of the few stations
\nin the down town area. The deals with the sponsors are termed
\nfor 10 to 30 years. Recently, Ascent Entertainment sold the
\nteams and the Pepsi Center for $461 million (Denver Business
\nJournal, 1999).<\/p>\n
\nalways do naming rights work out so well especially when the
\nfacility is sold. In Buffalo, home of the NHL Sabres, there
\nwas a contract dispute regarding the name of their arena.
\nThe arena which was called Marine Midland after a bank which
\nno longer exists. The parent company HSBC wanted the named
\nchanged of the arena. The Sabres dispute was over the fact
\nthat their contract with the bank was for the arena to be
\ncalled Marine Midland, who was to pay $15 million over 20
\nyears for the right. The facility’s standpoint is that they
\nspend lot of time and money promoting the name and then they
\nhave to change it. The Buffalo Sabres who was in default on
\ntheir loan with HSBC because of a $15 million loss last year
\nhas changed the name of the arena to HSBC arena.<\/p>\n
\nright experts report that during the early entitlement deals,
\nsponsors fail to protect themselves in the event that a merger
\nor buy out forces them to change their name (Business First,
\nWestern New York, 1999). In recent entitlement deals, sponsors
\nhave provisions in the contracts for a name change during
\nthe course of the agreement. In name rights sponsors this
\noccurrence happens mostly with banks due to buy outs. The
\ncosts of changing a name may average around $2 million. Corporate
\nsponsorship of naming rights is well established in professional
\nsports such as the Pepsi Center in Colorado and the Continental
\nArena in New Jersey.<\/p>\n
\nrecent trend in college athletic is naming rights for multipurpose
\nsports facilities. On Ohio State University’s campus, the
\nfacility the Schottenstein Center and the basketball and hockey
\narena the Value City Arena are named after the retail store
\nchain and owners. The owners of the retail chain paid $12.5
\nmillion for 75 years of advertising. The University of Wisconsin
\nsports facility is named after Kohl’s Department Stores. Syracuse
\nUniversity in 1979 was the first sports facility to sell naming
\nrights for $2.75 million for the Carrier Dome. Some companies
\nbuy naming rights for name recognition, tax deductions or
\nsupport of the community. Experts have not agreed as yet if
\nthe tax deductible millions spent on naming rights actually
\npay for themselves (Business First, Columbus 1995).<\/p>\n
\nBacked Securities<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nfor the multi million dollar arenas are being backed not only
\nby naming rights and sponsorship, but from revenues from luxury
\nsuite sales and food concessions. The Pepsi Center in Colorado
\nis an example of how asset backed securities were used to
\nbuild the arena. The borrowed funds are backed by the sale
\nof luxury suites, sponsors, and food concession sales. The
\noriginal owner of the Pepsi Center and its teams, Ascent Entertainment
\nGroup, reported while securing funds, “One benefit was
\nthat we received an investment rating…we were able to get
\nan A rating from Fitch, the highest rating for a sports financing.”(Treasury
\n& Risk Management, 1999). This led t a 6.94% interest
\nrate, which helped in raising $139.85 million towards the
\ntotal cost of the arena. D. L. Auxier, the director of securitization
\nservices in Ernst & Young, a structured finance group
\nreports some set backs with asset back issues. He fears, “the
\ninterest for sports franchises is short lived.” (Treasury
\n& Risk Management, 1999). If the securities are backed
\nby luxury suites and a team projects a certain amount of sales,
\nfalling short means adjusting the financial picture. In Florida,
\nthe Miami Heat’s arena’s $180 million in private revenue bonds
\nwas able to get bond insurance. It was the first time that
\nprivate bonds issued for a new arena had received an insurers
\nguarantee even though there is a shadow of a doubt of meeting
\nrevenues. According to Larry Levitz, of MBIA Insurance Corp.,
\n“The Heat’s expected revenues could fall 40% but over
\nhalf of the arena revenues is from contractually obligated
\nincome.” (South Florida Business Journal, Miami-Dade
\nEdition, 1998) It seems that luxury suites are in demand.
\nThe Reunion Arena in Dallas and the Continental Arena in New
\nJersey are both outdated because they don’t offer enough suites.
\nThe American Airlines Arena in Miami was able to raise $180
\nmillion toward their arena, home of the Miami Heat. The arena
\nhas 65 luxury boxes and is able to take in approximately $13
\nmillion a year from leases. The arena leased four first of
\na kind court side luxury boxes for $500,000 each. (South Florida
\nBusiness Journal, Miami-Dade Edition, 1998). Other luxury
\nboxes have gone for $300,00 at the Staples Center in Los Angeles
\nand at Madison Square Garden in New York City. For the new
\narena that will house the San Antonio Spurs and the Live Stock
\nShow\/Rodeo in will have 50 new luxury suites and 340,00 potential
\nseats that are sold out in advance. The center will receive
\n100% of parking , concession, ticket and adverting revenues
\nas well. (Amusement Business 1999).<\/p>\n
\nrevenues may be offered to a new arena by management companies
\nwho want the contract to manage the facility. In 1998, two
\nbig management companies were in competition with each other
\nfor the management rights over the smaller version of the
\nSuperDome in New Orleans. The Philadelphia based company,
\nSpectator Management Group (SMG), who already has a contract
\nwith the SuperDome, offered $5.6 million cash toward the construction
\nof the Baby Dome. Another management company, Houston based
\nLeisure Management Inc. (LMI), offered $6 million for both
\ncontracts. The extra cash would allow the building of luxury
\nsuites that would be necessary to attract corporate contracts
\nand big league teams. LMI has 10 arena management contracts
\nin the South. Two other companies made offers in the form
\nof cash loans. Globe Facilities Services of Tampa, FL. and
\na New York based management company, Ogden Entertainment,
\nmade cash loan offers. Ogden Entertainment has 34 other arenas
\nthat it manages and also had made offers for cash loans. But
\na offer of cash without interest is certainly more desirable.
\nIn order to make an arena management bid, the company must
\nsubmit information on their assets. Ogden Entertainment reported
\n$3.6 billion, SMG reported their assets totaling $64.7 million,
\nleisure Management International reported $2 million in assets
\nand Globe Facility Services reported $409,000 in assets (
\nNew Orleans city Business, 1998). Those who do not submit
\nthe information would not be in the running for consideration.
\nJoint management of both Domes would save millions in equipment
\nand personnel sharing, and in attractive contracts with vendors
\nand sponsors.<\/p>\n
\namazes me still that millions of dollars are available for
\nthose who need to access it. In 1958, the Phoenix Sun Devils
\nStadium was built for $1 million dollars. Quite a bit of money
\nback then. Today the new Foxboro arena is estimated to cost
\n$325 million when built. My husband and I priced the tickets
\nfor the NHL all stars game in Denver, Co. Just the tickets
\nand hotel would costs us, $1,500 each. At some point in time
\nthe costs of going to games is going to be more than the average
\njoe can afford. I do not think the economy is equating with
\nwhat the average annual salary is. Yes, there are the dot
\ncom millionaires but not everyone has been so fortunate to
\nhave gotten on that boat. It could be that my personal salary
\nnever quite made it out of the range it was in the 80’s. Nevertheless,
\nI think with the new presidency, there will be economic changes
\nwhere going to a game will just not be affordable anymore.
\nThe new costly arenas will not fill their seats, not be able
\nto pay their bills and sponsors will not be so willing to
\nspend up millions on advertising rights.<\/p>\n
\nfor Arenas and Financing<\/p>\n
\nfor chart:
\nA: City A
\nB: Facility B
\nC: Opening C
\nD: Total Cost D
\nE: Public Share E
\nF: Comments F<\/p>\n
\nFL.
\nNational Car Rental Center 1998
\n$185 million 100%
\nPanthers home financed by Broward County<\/p>\n
\nTN.
\nNashville Arena 1998
\n$144 million 100%
\nPredators home in the NHL-voters approved a property tax
\nincrease<\/p>\n
\nFL.
\nIce Palace 1996
\n$153 million 100%
\nTourist bonds and ticket charges will repay municipal bonds<\/p>\n
\nWA.
\nKey Arena 1995
\n$119.5 million 83%
\nCity gutted Seattle Coliseum and rebuilt from the inside<\/p>\n
\nN.C.
\nRaleigh Sports Arena 1999
\n$140 million 75%
\nN.C. State boosters help facility for NHL and NCAA-home
\nof Hurricanes and Wolfpack<\/p>\n
\nGA.
\nPhilips Arena 1999
\n$284 million 74%
\nTurner contributes money- home of the NHL Thrashers<\/p>\n
\nPaul, MN.
\nRiver Centre 2001
\n$130 million 73%
\nThe city and state split the public bonds<\/p>\n
\nTX.
\nTo Be Announced 2000-01
\n$232 million 54%
\nall public contributions from city, not county or state,
\nhome of the NHL Stars<\/p>\n
\nNY.
\nHSBC 1996
\n$122 million 37%
\nNew York State put in $25 million and Erie county put in
\n$20 million-name change 1999<\/p>\n
\nOH.
\nNationwide Arena 2000
\n$139 million 14%
\nvoters shot down sales tax raise for arena, home of the
\nNHL Blue Jackets<\/p>\n
\nOR.
\nRose Garden 1995
\n$307 million 11%
\nA mulit use complex<\/p>\n
\nPenn.
\nCoreStates Center 1995
\n$213 million 6%
\nOwner got $13 million in city and state loans- First Union
\nCorp. bank merger acquired CoreStates, kept name<\/p>\n
\nCO.
\nPepsi Center 1999
\n$160 million 0
\nCity finally approved downtown facility agreement, delays
\nin building for 2 years<\/p>\n
\nCanada
\nMolson Centre 1996
\n$230 million 0
\nCanadien’s home financed by beer giant<\/p>\n
\nD.C.
\nMCI Center 1997
\n$200 million 0
\nPart of a redevelopment plan<\/p>\n
\nGeneral Motors Palace 1995
\n$116 million 0
\nGrizzlies owner built arena and bought franchise<\/p>\n
\nMA.
\nFleet Center 1995
\n$160 million 0
\nCeltics and Bruins home owned by Delaware North Cos.<\/p>\n
\nCanada
\nCorel Center 1996
\n$145 million 0
\nCorel paid owner Terrance Investments $25 million for naming
\nrights<\/p>\n
\nTX.
\nThe Ballpark in Arlington 1994
\n$191 million 71%
\nArlington voters passed \u00bd cent sales tax for Rangers<\/p>\n
\nTX.
\nTexas Stadium 1971
\n$35 million 100%
\nCowboys pay Irving rent<\/p>\n
\nWorth, TX.
\nTexas Motor Speedway 1997
\n$121 million 0
\nSpeedway Motorsports built facility and gave title to Fort
\nWorth<\/p>\n
\nPrairie, TX.
\nLone Star Park at G.P. 1997
\n$96 million 68%
\nGrand Prairie voters approved a \u00bd cent sales tax
\nfor the Ponies<\/p>\n
\nRutherford, New Jersey
\nContinental Arena 1981(original) new arena to be built
\n$250 million if stays in East Rutherford
\nAKA the Meadowlands, Home of the Devils<\/p>\n
\nArizona.
\nLos Arcos (to be announced) 2001
\n$175-183 million 30-35%
\nNew home of the Phoenix Coyotes part of a large redevelopment.<\/p>\n
\nTo Be Announced. 2002
\n$325 million 0
\nbadly need new home for the New England Patriots will be
\nprivately funded<\/p>\n
\nAZ.
\nSun Devil Stadium 1958
\n$1 million 100%
\nused by college and professional teams built on the campus
\non Arizona State.<\/p>\n
\nAntonio TX.
\nTo Be Announced 2002
\n$175 million 70-80%
\nTaxes will pay off $260 million worth of revenue bonds in
\nabout 20 years. The teams will lease the building from Bexar
\nCounty.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nfrom Dallas Business Journal 1997 and www.epinion.com.<\/p>\n
\nD. (12\/19\/1997). Arena proposal would rob the poor to pay
\nthe rich. Dallas Business Journal, v21, i17, p39.<\/p>\n
\nWeek, i3706, p218.<\/p>\n
\ndeals. Business First-Western New York, v15, i47, p5.<\/p>\n
\n(7\/31\/00). Las Vegas Business Press, v17, i30, p14.<\/p>\n
\nball park. (5\/3\/00). The Boston Globe.
\nCaywood, T. (2\/2\/98). Scoring the contract. New Orleans City
\nBusiness, v18, i31, p1-4.<\/p>\n
\nnaming rights. Business First, Columbus, v12, i13, p4.<\/p>\n
\nball park. Business First-Columbus, v16, i52, p1-2.<\/p>\n
\nSt. Louis Business Journal, v20, i44, p1-3.<\/p>\n
\nBusiness v86, i7, p50-52.<\/p>\n
\nwith arena bill. San Antonio Business Journal, v12, i6, p1-2.<\/p>\n
\nnew heat arena. South Florida Business Journal, Miami-Dade
\nEdition, v18, i38,p7a.<\/p>\n
\nBusiness Journal, v51, i2, p17a-19a.<\/p>\n
\nAmusement Business, v111, i46, p3-5.<\/p>\n
\nRisk Management, v9, i4, p21.<\/p>\n
\nSons, Inc.<\/p>\n
\n(1999). Financing Facility Development .Sawyer, T. Facilities
\nplanning for physical activity and sport. P43, Iowa.<\/p>\n
\nnew basketball, hockey stadium. The Record.<\/p>\n
\non funding. Dallas Business Journal, v21, i8, p8-10.<\/p>\n
\nsystem. San Antonio Business Journal, v11, i21, p54-56.<\/p>\n
\narena. San Antonio Business Journal, v13, i2, p1-2.<\/p>\n
\nnots. Amusement Business, v109, i9, p18.<\/p>\n
\nwww.newlosarcos.com.<\/p>\n
\n new state of the art sporting arenas costing anywhere between
\n $30 million to $300 million to build, huge financial investments
\n must be made. There are many options in financing sport and
\n recreation facilities than involve both public and private
\n arrangements and investments. This paper will address various
\n financial ventures and the benefits and pitfalls of those
\n options.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_options":[]},"categories":[293,291],"tags":[35,8,31,33],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p4btio-1C","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":319,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/advantages-of-diversifying-the-funds-of-sports-organizations\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":0},"title":"Advantages of Diversifying the Funds of Sports Organizations","date":"October 7, 2008","format":false,"excerpt":"Submitted by: Aaron G. Lawson - Acworth, Georgia Advantages of Diversifying the Funds of Sports Organizations Diversification of funds is a hot topic in the business world. The sports world must adapt and apply diversification principles in order to maximize the stability of sports organizations. Diversification is a generic term\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Contemporary Sports Issues"","img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4708,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/the-national-football-leagues-brand-and-stadium-opportunities\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":1},"title":"The National Football League\u2019s Brand and Stadium Opportunities","date":"December 1, 2016","format":false,"excerpt":"Authors: Marcos A. Abreu, Brandon D. Spradley Corresponding Author: Marcos Abreu Doctoral Student United States Sports Academy One Academy Drive Daphne, Alabama 36526 mabreu@students.ussa.edu 251-626-3303 Marcos Abreu is a doctoral student at the United States Sports Academy studying sports management. The NFL Brand & Stadium Opportunities ABSTRACT Besides increasing shared\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Contemporary Sports Issues"","img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":203,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/marketing-and-promotion-of-the-olympic-games\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":2},"title":"Marketing and Promotion of the Olympic Games","date":"June 2, 2005","format":false,"excerpt":"Submitted by: Johnny K. Lee, Ph.D Abstract","rel":"","context":"In "Contemporary Sports Issues"","img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":2342,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/ratios-of-certified-athletic-trainers-to-athletic-teams-and-number-of-athletes-in-south-carolina-collegiate-settings\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":3},"title":"Ratios of Certified Athletic Trainers\u2019 to Athletic Teams and Number of Athletes in South Carolina Collegiate Settings","date":"March 16, 2015","format":false,"excerpt":"Submitted by\u00a0Robert Bradley1, Ed.D, ATC, SCAT*. Fred Cromartie2, Ed.D*, Jeff Briggs3 PhD.*, Fred Battenfield4, Ph.D.*, Jon Boulet5 Ph.D*. 1*\u00a0Assistant Professor of Sport management\u00a0at North Greenville University,\u00a0Tigersville,\u00a0South Carolina,\u00a029680 2*\u00a0Director of Doctoral Studies at the United States Sports Academy, Daphne, Alabama, 36526 3* Professor of Sport Management\u00a0at North Greenville University, Tigersville, South\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Contemporary Sports Issues"","img":{"alt_text":"Table 1","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/03\/Table1.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":7948,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/the-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-stress-it-put-on-college-athletics\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":4},"title":"The COVID-19 Pandemic and the stress it put on College Athletics","date":"August 13, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"Authors: Matthew J. Williams1, Devin M. Mathis 2 1Department of Education, The University of Virginia\u2019s College at Wise, Wise, VA, USA2Senior Student, The University of Virginia\u2019s College at Wise, Wise, VA, USA Corresponding Author:G. Andrew Williams M.A. M.S.96 Los OlmosGreen Valley, AZ 85614parktaylorplace@aol.com520 668-4701 Matthew J. Williams D.S.M., M.B.A., M.S.\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Commentary"","img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":144,"url":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/article\/marketing-sport-and-a-city-the-case-of-athens-2004\/","url_meta":{"origin":100,"position":5},"title":"Marketing Sport and a City: The Case Of Athens 2004","date":"February 18, 2008","format":false,"excerpt":"Submitted by: George Karlis, PhD. Introduction The opportunity for a city to host the Olympic Games constitutes an enormous economic social and cultural commitment, as it is the world's biggest sporting event. It is an opportunity that, if properly managed and marketed, will bring a number of positive long-term benefits\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Contemporary Sports Issues"","img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=100"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6661,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100\/revisions\/6661"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=100"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=100"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesportjournal.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=100"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}